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Hidden probe attacks on ultralong fiber laser key
distribution systems
Juan Carlos Garcia-Escartin and Pedro Chamorro-Posada.
Abstract—In ultralong fiber laser key distribution, two sides
use standard optical equipment to create kilometer long fiber
lasers in a communication link to establish a secret key. Its
security rests on the assumption that any attacker would need
much more sophisticated equipment and techniques than those
of the legitimate user in order to discover the generated key. We
present a challenge to that assumption with a hidden probe attack
in which the eavesdropper hides a weak signal in the unavoidable
noise floor that appears in the laser during amplification and
probes with it the configuration of one or both communication
parties. We comment how this attack can compromise differ-
ent proposals for ultralong laser key distribution and propose
possible countermeasures.
Index Terms—Optical fiber lasers, Security, Optical fiber
communication.
I. KEY DISTRIBUTION
KEY distribution is a fundamental problem in moderncommunication networks. When two sides, Alice and
Bob, want to establish a a private communication channel, they
usually turn to symmetric cryptosystems, such as AES [1].
For convenience and security, most symmetric cryptosystems
follow Kerckhoffss principle [2]: the users assume all the
details of the implementation are known and the security rests
on a shared secret key known only to Alice and Bob. That
way, if a key is stolen, they can immediately switch to a new
one without changing anything else.
A key distribution method gives a way to generate these
secret keys and communicate them securely to both parties.
Usually, there is first a slow key distribution procedure that
establishes a new key for each communication session between
Alice and Bob. Then, the generated session key is used in a fast
symmetric cryptosystem to send the data. These session keys
are relatively short, usually no more than a few hundred of bits
long, which makes the initial slower distribution acceptable.
In current computer networks, key distribution is enabled
by asymmetric, or public key, cryptography. Public key cryp-
tography is based on the assumed asymmetry of certain
mathematical problems. One example is the RSA cryptosystem
[3], in which privacy is protected by the fact that, while
multiplying two large primes, p and q, is straightforward, there
are no known algorithms for fast factorization of a number
N = pq except for Shor’s algorithm [4], which would require
a full scale quantum computer, which seems unlikely to be
built in the near future.
Since the appearance of Quantum Key Distribution, QKD
[5], [6], there has been a growing interest in key distribution
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systems where the protection comes from physical principles.
The main problem in physical key distribution is finding an
adequate channel which gives more information to Alice and
Bob than it leaks to Eve. In quantum key distribution, the
laws of Quantum Mechanics guarantee that eavesdroppers
are detected. The protection comes from the imposibility of
measuring a quantum system without disturbing its state. Alice
and Bob can find out if there is an eavesdropper and, after
public discussion with a privacy amplification protocol that
uses a small shared key [7], [8], they can produce long keys
known only to the two of them. For quantum communication
channels there exist rigurous proofs of the theoretical security
of the scheme under different assumptions [9]–[14]. However,
practical details of the implementation can lead to deviations
from the ideal system which can be exploited in different
attacks [15]–[24] and it is essential to be careful when building
a practical system.
Spurred by the success of QKD, there have appeared
different proposals for physical key distribution with varying
degrees of protection using optical or electrical systems [25]–
[31]. In this paper, we discuss key distribution systems with
ultralong lasers, following the proposal of Scheuer and Yariv
of an optical system that builds on long distance fiber links to
create a long fiber laser cavity between Alice and Bob [32].
The basic concept behind this and most alternative proposals
for physical key distribution is the “keyless cryptography”
protocol of Alpern and Schneider [33]. The protocol gives a
way for Alice and Bob to agree on a secret key using a public
anonymous channel. Both Alice and Bob can broadcast a list
of bits for a random key they have generated, announcing
them as their common key proposal. Anyone can see the
proposed values kAB[i] for the ith bit of the key from both
Alice and Bob, but, if the channel is anonymous, only Alice
and Bob know which bit belongs to each one of them. They
can check all the bits in the sequence and, if the bits are equal,
they discard them. If they are different they can choose, for
instance, Alice’s bit as the next key bit.
The lack of an adequate public anonymous channel has
stopped the practical implementation of the “keyless cryptog-
raphy” protocol. The proposals for physical key distribution
systems try to solve this problem.
In ultralong laser key distribution, instead of aiming for a
complete proof of security, like in QKD, the purpose is to
introduce a physical asymmetry, much like the computational
asymmetry in public key algorithms. An analogy in terms of
an everyday physical security device would be a combination
safe. It is not physically impossible for a thief to open it, but,
if properly designed, it introduces a degree of complication
that deters most attempts while it imposes a light burden on
2the user.
In an ultralong fiber laser key distribution system, the
legitimate users would only need to set up a relatively simple
physical system and perform standard measurements but an
eavesdropper would require more sophisticated equipment and
methods. We suggest a possible attack that would lower
that barrier for the attacker, who would only need to hide
probe pulses in the floor noise of the fiber laser. To our
knowledge, this is the first detailed analysis of an active attacks
against UFL key distribution systems and shows it should be
considered as an important threat.
In Section II, we present the fundamental principles of ul-
tralong fiber laser key distribution and discuss three alternative
implementations. In Section III we present the hidden probe
attack using spread spectrum modulation and give a brief
analysis of its possibilities and limitations. Section IV gives
the simulation results for different hidden probe attacks on
the three ultralong fiber laser key distribution implementations
under study. Finally, in Section V, we discuss the extent of this
attack and propose potential countermeasures.
II. ULTRALONG FIBER LASER KEY DISTRIBUTION
Fiber lasers use optical fiber as the gain medium of a
laser. Fiber lasers can have a cavity spanning for hundred of
kilometers [34]–[36]. These ultralong fiber lasers, UFLs, can
be built over existing fiber communication links. A fiber link
with fiber mirrors at the ends gives a suitable laser cavity.
For instance, we can use fiber Bragg gratings to reflect light
to chose a resonating frequency from the allowed modes. The
laser gain comes from a pump signal at another frequency and
nonlinear conversion. The gain of the cavity can be distributed
along the fiber or concentrated on small sections of the whole
length. UFLs can use Raman amplification, Erbium-Doped
Fiber Amplifiers, EDFAs, or Semiconductor Optical Amplifier,
SOAs.
In ultralong fiber laser key distribution, the final state in
the fiber laser cavity is tuned from the ends, which host each
communication party. Alice and Bob can change their setup
to alter the cavity and determine the frequency of the lasing
signal. Each one has two alternative configurations, 0 and 1,
and there are four possible states for the cavity, 00, 01, 10
and 11, where the first bit describes the configuration chosen
by Alice and the second bit the configuration chosen by Bob.
This state is public and Eve can measure it at any time with
negligible impact on the state. In a properly designed system,
the stationary states for the configurations 01 and 10 will
be extremely similar and Eve will not be able to tell them
apart without a considerable effort. If Alice and Bob choose
their configurations randomly and produce a new state every
T seconds, they can agree on a secret key by discarding all
the time bins where their chosen bits were the same. All three,
Alice, Bob and Eve, can monitor the channel and know when
the configurations 01 and 10 appear, but only Alice and Bob
have a simple way to tell apart 01 from 10. Alice knows her
chosen bit, so Bob’s bit must have chosen the opposite value.
Bob can do a similar deduction. On average, half of the time
bins there will be a 01 or 10 state, which gives one bit of secret
key. Alice and Bob can simply use Alice’s choice, which they
both know, as their key bit.
The assymetry comes from the additional information Alice
and Bob have. They both know their own choice of con-
figuration and do not need to distinguish 01 and 10 states
from measurements of the channel. Eve does not have that
luxury and must try to establish the difference from channel
measurements or by peering inside Alice’s or Bob’s setup.
Eve’s strategies can be grouped into active and passive
attacks. In passive attacks, Eve just reads the channel, tapping
the fiber as unobtrusively as possible. Her main challenge is
analyzing the data to tell apart the states 01 and 10. She can
look into transient states or study the spectrum [37], [38].
In active attacks, Eve will introduce a signal to discover the
setup on Alice’s or Bob’s side. The usual assumption is that
any active attacks would show due to the gain in the laser
[32]. Any probes send to determine Alice’s or Bob’s state
would produce a conspicuous change in the channel and the
exchange could be aborted until no eavesdropping is detected.
In the previous literature, active attacks have been put aside on
those grounds. In the rest of the paper, we will show they are
indeed an important concern. If Eve manages to hide probe in
the floor noise that appears during amplification, the change
in the channel is difficult to detect and sneak active attacks
become feasible.
There are multiple experimental and theoretical results
for UFL key distribution with different configurations [38]–
[40]. We will evaluate our hidden probe attack against three
main families of implementations: a basic setup following
the original proposal of Scheuer and Yariv [32], which uses
frequency selection, a length-based key distribution system
[41] and a dark state implementation with lasing and non-
lasing stationary states [42].
A. Basic setup: selective frequency setup
Our reference system will be the original proposal of
UFL key distribution of Scheuer and Yariv [32] and its ring
implementation [37] shown in Fig. 1. The gain of the fiber
laser comes from two Erbium-Doped Fiber Amplifier, EDFAs,
one at each side. The cavity is closed by two tunable mirrors.
Alice and Bob each have a Fiber Bragg Grating, FBG, which
can be tension-tuned to give peak reflectivity frequencies f0
or f1. If both mirrors have the same peak frequency, the fiber
laser will resonate at that value f0 or f1. For the 01 and 10
configurations where Alice and Bob choose a different mirror,
there will be a signal oscillating close to the average frequency
fc =
f0+f1
2
.
The signals for the 01 and 10 configurations are difficult
to distinguish, which gives the desired behaviour for the key
distribution procedure we outlined in the previous Section.
The system at each side is completed with a coupler that
samples the resulting signal. This gives Alice and Bob the
ability to read the channel to see which of the possible
stationary states, 00, 01, 10 or 11, has been reached and to
check for active attacks.
In our simulations, we will use the system as described in
the experimental realization given in [37].
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Fig. 1: UFL key distribution with frequency selection. Alice
and Bob can change the state inside the fiber laser cavity by
tuning the reflection peak of a Fiber Bragg Grating, FBG.
B. Length variation setup
An alternative way to alter the fiber cavity is changing
its length. Figure 2 shows the diagram of an experimental
demonstration of UFL key distribution based on this principle
[41]. Instead of selecting the mode by attenuating all the
signals outside a certain frequency range, a variable delay
loop changes the free spectral range of the fiber laser cavity,
resulting in a frequency shift in the lasing signal.
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Fig. 2: UFL key distribution with length selection. Alice and
Bob can change the state inside the fiber laser cavity by
switching between a short and a long fiber loop.
Alice and Bob have a one kilometer delay line they can
selectively switch on or off. The 0 and 1 configurations on
each side correspond to the short and long lines respectively.
The total length of the fiber determines the lasing frequency,
with kHz shifts for the chosen values in the experiment (a total
of 50 km of fiber in the 00 configuration, which becomes 51
km for the 01 and 10 states and 52 km for the 11 setup).
Again, while the states corresponding to 00 and 11 can be
easily told apart, the 01 and 10 states are almost identical.
The system is completed on each side with a bandpass filter,
BPF, to keep within the frequency range of interest in the laser
and monitoring couplers that allow the users to sample the
channel and check for attacks.
C. Dark state setup
The third implementation we will consider is a dark state
ultralong fiber laser key distribution system [42]. The scheme
is essentially the basic frequency selective setup of Fig. 1, but
adding an interferometer before the output of Alice and Bob
that acts as a narrow bandpass filter so that only signals very
close to f0 or f1 get through. In this case, there is only lasing
for the 00 and 11 configurations and the 01 and 10 states
correspond to the noise floor which makes state identification
more difficult.
The term “dark state” refers to the feature that, now, the bits
of the key are generated for a fibee without a laser oscillation
(a dark fiber which only carries noise).
III. HIDDEN PROBE ATTACKS
In all the presented UFL key distribution systems, there
appears a noise signal during the gain stage which allows Eve
to hide a probe signal. Some systems even artificially inject
more noise as a countermeasure to passive attacks where Eve
measures the transient response of the system [37]. In the
active attack we propose, Eve introduces a signal below the
noise floor to learn the configuration of one of the side’s (Alice
in our example). The general attack is described in Fig. 3 for
the basic UFL key distribution system, but it would be the
same for the rest of the setups.
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Fig. 3: Attack setup: Eve will tap the fiber close to Alice
to learn her state. In the input to Alice, she will introduce
a modulated signal from a transmitter and can, optionally,
monitor the channel. In the output from Alice, Eve will
measure the light in the fiber to recover the probe signal and
analyze it to determine the configuration inside Alice. Eve can
also use that signal to monitor the global state of the laser.
Eve will send a spread spectrum signal extending through
all the available bandwith. She will prepare a probe pulse and
then modulate it with a phase modulator, PM, controlled by a
pseudo-random code, the PR sequence [43], so that the total
power is stretched in the band of interest. This will reduce
the peak power which allows to hide the signal in the noise
of the fiber laser. The resulting signal will be modulated in
time so that it will only be active for a probe time Tp = 1
ms, smaller than the total bit time T . The limited time frame
helps to avoid affecting the transients in the laser and makes
sure the probe is only sent when there is an established state
in the fiber.
4Laser PM
PR sequence
From Bob To Alice
90 : 10
To Eve’s receiver
OSA
νE
(a) Eve’s transmitter with spread spectrum modulation using a pseudorandom,
PR, sequence, and a phase modulator PM.
From Eve’s transmitter
PR sequence
90 : 10
To BobFrom Alice
PM
νE , ∆ν1 νE , ∆ν2 ∆f
(b) Eve’s receiver with direct detection.
From Eve’s transmitter
PR sequence
90 : 10
To Bob
Laser
From Alice
PM
50 : 50
νLO
νE , ∆ν1 νE , ∆ν2
fIF , ∆fIF∆f
(c) Eve’s receiver with coherent detection.
Fig. 4: Eve’s transmitter (4a) and receiver for incoherent (4b)
and coherent (4c) detection.
The probe signal is sent inside of Alice’s setup. For the
basic, frequency selective implementation, Eve will center
her probe at one frequency, for instance f0. If the mirror of
Alice is in the 0 configuration, the receiver Eve has placed
at Alice’s output will detect the probe pulse. A matching
demodulator using the same PR sequence permits to recover
the original pulse with a processing gain with respect to the
noise proportional to the spreading factor [44], producing a
clear signal. However, if Alice’s mirror is centered around
f1, most of the probe signal will be destroyed and Eve will
measure a noise-like signal. The result of her measurement
gives her a way to determine the configuration inside Alice.
In the dark state implementation the principle will be similar,
with some technical differences (see Section IV-C).
For length coding, Eve can check for the autocorrelation of
the probe signal with a delayed version of itself. The delay
can be set to be equivalent to either the short or the long
configuration. If there is a peak at the receiver, Eve will know
she has chosen the same bit as Alice. If not, she knows Alice
has chosen the other value.
We assume Eve can synchronize her pulses either because
she knows the internal configuration of Alice, except for her
random choices, and can predict the total delay of the probe
or because Eve has determined the delay from autocorrelation
measures of previous probes before launching the definitive
attack.
The use of spread spectrum modulation to hide a signal
has been tested before in optical fiber communications in
optical steganography [45], [46]. In optical steganography,
the end users try to establish a covert channel so that an
external eavesdropper does not know any communication is
taking place [47]. Many proposals for optical steganogra-
phy use spread spectrum modulation and related schemes to
hide a communication channel in the Amplified Spontaneous
Emission,or ASE, noise from the EDFAs [48]–[51]. Optical
steganography also shows ways to use a covert channel for
synchronization [52], which could be useful if do not have an
alternative way to establish a clock.
Before presenting the results of the simulation, we would
like to examine the ultimate limitations of probe attacks.
Shannon’s noisy channel theorem [53] tell us the maximum
possible communication rate for analog communication is
given by
C =
B
T
=W log2(1 + SNR) (1)
where C is the number of bits per second (or B bits in a time
segment T ) that can be reliably transmitted using a bandwith
W when our signal to noise ratio is SNR.
Eve’s hidden probes should pass unnoticed. The EDFA
means strong active probes will stand out when measuring
the channel. This limits the SNR of our probes, which should
have a power below the noise floor of the EDFAs that will
hide them. A brief informal calculation shows such an attack is
plausible with weak probes. Taking as the bandwith the usual
separation between f0 and f1, in the range of GHz, and a time
per bit around 1 ms to allow for a stationary state to build up,
even for a probe 30 dB below the noise floor, SNR = 10−3,
we could send aroundB = TW log2(1+SNR) . 1442 bits if
we had and appropriate codebook of random signals. Actually,
what we have is two different channels where we can imagine
Alice is modulating the data with two waveforms, one for each
configuration. While the actual bit rate is likely to be smaller
than this best case limit, this rapid calculation shows there is
plenty of room for a probe attack.
Optical steganography has also proposals with matching
gratings [54] which remind of the basic UFL key distribution
system and could suggest which waveforms would perform
better in taking information out of Alice.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulations of the UFL dynamics have been based on
the models of [32], [37], which have been adapted for the three
UFL configurations considered. We assume fiber sections of
25 km and a typical signalling time of T = 3 ms and allow
Eve for a probe time of Tp . 1 ms. This permits Eve to
listen to the laser channel and decide if a useful secret key
5transmission is taking place. The simulation of Eve’s channel
probing is performed in the presence of the corresponding
steady state cavity field.
The schematic of Eve’s transmitter is shown in Fig. 4a. Eve
has to carefully adjust her laser output power (for instance,
using a variable attenuator) in order to avoid the detection of
her presence. The CW optical signal is then phase modulated
using a pseudorandom sequence and its amplitude shaped with
a Tp pulse. We have assumed that Eve’s laser has a 100 kHz
linewidth. In all cases, the fiber attenuation has been set to 0.2
dB/km and the fiber group index to ng = 1.462.
The phase modulators at Eve’s receiver and transmitted are
assumed to act synchronously. Group delays both in Alice’s
setup and also in Eve’s equipment are, therefore, most relevant
and their effect is discussed in detail below.
Eve can perform either a direct or a heterodyne coherent
detection on her receiver, as described in Figs. 4b and 4c
respectively. The phase modulation is a highly nonlinear
operation that, besides the desired effect of recovering the
temporal pulse shape of Eve’s probing signal, will mix Eve’s
noise. For this reason, bandpass optical filters are placed both
before and after the phase modulator. The filter specifications
will be set by the particular UFL and Eve’s system imple-
mentations. In the coherent detection receiver, for instance,
the response of the optical filters will be determined by the
value of the RF intermediate frequency corresponding to the
beating of the Eve’s lasers. In the numerical simulations,
where a limited overall system bandwidth is considered, these
filters are very important to obtain a faithful representation of
the modelled system and the specific filter parameters used
obey mainly to numerical considerations. We have used very
steep supergaussian m = 4 spectral amplitude responses with
∆ν1 = 2 GHz and ∆ν2 = 200 MHz. The bandwidth of
the bandpass intermediate frequency filter in Fig. 4c used in
the calculations is ∆fFI = 20 MHz and the lowpass filter
bandwith ∆f = 10 kHz. For such a small filter bandwidth,
thermal noise at the reciver can be made to remain below the
signal level in those of cases commented below where the
detection of Eve’s signal is sucessful, and has been ignored in
the numerical calculations.
Eve’s photodetector is assumed to have a responsivity of 0.8
A/W and her local oscillator laser has a linewidth of 100 kHz
and 1 mW of optical power. An increase of the local oscillator
power will have a direct impact on the receiver performance.
A. Basic setup
The spectral responses of the gratings used by Alice and
Bob to code their information have a relative shift of 5
GHz and have identical FWHM spectral widths of 5 GHz.
Their amplide responses are shown in Fig.5. The EDFAs are
assumed to have a small signal gain ofG = 20 dB, a saturation
power of Psat = 13 dBm, and a noise figure of F = 4.5 dB.
The optical power measured by Alice at her output coupler
port during effective key transmission is Pout ≃ 19.5 mW.
Eve’s laser is tuned to Alice’s 0 state grating and she
modulates her carrier with a binary pseudorandom −1,+1
signal with a bin duration of 1 ns. The group delay of
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Fig. 5: Amplitude response of the gratings used both by Alice
and Bob to set their respective state.
the grating is found to be negligible for this setup and the
group delay associated with the propagation in a few meters
of Erbium doped fiber has also been neglected. In general,
if the group delay at Alice’s premises were relevant, Eve
could always synchronize her transmitter and receiver phase
modulators according to her knowledge of Alice’s equipment.
The optical spectra seen at Alice and Eve’s receivers and the
photocurrent pulses measured by Eve are displayed in Fig. 6.
Although Alice cannot detect the presence of Eve’s signal, Eve
can perfectly distinguish the grating Alice is using since she
has tuned her laser to the 0 grating of Alice. Both the direct
detection and the coherent receiver would permit to determine
the UFL state, even though the heterodyne receiver provides
a significative improvement of the signal level.
B. Length setup
In this setup, Alice and Bob set their respective states
by adding or not a section of 1 km of fiber to the optical
cavity instead of using gratings. We have assumed that both
transmission ends include an optical filter with a Gaussian
shape and 5 GHz FWHM spectral width. All the EDFAs
used both by Alice and Bob are assumed to have a small
signal gain of G = 10 dB, a saturation power of Psat = 13
dBm, and a noise figure of F = 4.5 dB. The optical power
measured by Alice at his output coupler port during effective
key transmission is Pout ≃ 3.5 mW.
Eve’s laser frequency is again tuned 2.5 GHz below the
UFL center frequency and she modulates her carrier with a
binary pseudorandom −1,+1 signal with a bin duration of
1 ns. Whereas a good synchronization exists between Eve’s
transmitted and received signal in the absence of the additional
fiber segment, the presence of the additional path of 1 km
length makes the synchronization to be lost and permits Eve
to determine Alice state.
The optical spectra seen at Alice and Eve’s receivers and
the photocurrent pulses measured by Eve are displayed in Fig.
7. Again, Alice cannot detect the presence of Eve’s signal but
Eve can perfectly distinguish the state of Alice. In this case,
only the heterodyne receiver permits to determine the UFL
state. As opposed to the previous case, now Eve’s signal is
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Fig. 6: Plots (a) and (b) display the optical spectra at Alice
output coupler in the 01 and 10 states, respectively. Marked
in red is the contribution from Eve’s signal. (c) and (d) are
the corresponding optical spectra at Eve’s receiver after her
phase modulator. The fotocurrent measured by Eve is shown
in (e) for a direct detection receiver and in (f) for a heterodyne
coherent receiver. Solid lines correspond to the 01 state and
dashed to the 10 state.
out of the pass-band of the filter of Alice who listens to the
channel before the Eve’s signal has traversed the amplifiers.
C. Dark states setup
In this setup, all the UFL parameters are identical to those of
the basic case but now Alice and Bob add a high-finesse Fabry-
Perot optical filter with ∆f = 25MHz FWHM bandwidth and
5 GHz FSR at their respective transmission ends. Secret key
transmission now takes place at the non-lasing states of the
UFL. Even though the group delay of this filter is significative,
Eve has to increase the bin duration of her phase modulator
to Tb = 0.5 µs to accommodate her probe signal into the
narrow filter bandwidth. For this modulation speed, the effect
of the group delay is again negligible and her transmitter and
receiver remain mutually synchronized.
The optical spectra seen at Alice and Eve’s receivers and
the photocurrent pulses measured by Eve are displayed in
Fig. 8. Once again, Eve’s signal is buried in noise at Alice
receiver and she cannot detect the presence of Eve, but Eve
can distinguish the state of Alice since she has tuned her laser
to the 0 grating of Alice. As in the length setup, only the
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Fig. 7: Plots (a) and (b) display the optical spectra at Alice
output coupler in the 01 and 10 states, respectively. Marked
in red is the contribution from Eve’s signal. (c) and (d) are
the corresponding optical spectra at Eve’s receiver after her
phase modulator. The fotocurrent measured by Eve is shown
in (e) for a direct detection receiver and in (f) for a heterodyne
coherent receiver. Solid lines correspond to the 01 state and
dashed to the 10 state.
heterodyne receiver permits the effective detection of Eve’s
signal.
V. DISCUSSION: SIGNIFICANCE AND COUNTERMEASURES
We have presented a hidden probe attack where Eve can
learn the configuration inside the end of an ultralong fiber laser
key distribution system, allowing her to learn the established
key. Using spread spectrum modulation, Eve can blend her
probe inside the amplification noise in the channel and mask
her presence. We have shown that she can attack different
implementations of UFL key distribution with relatively simple
equipment which depends on the concrete system under attack.
The results show active attacks must be seriously considered
in UFL key distribution.
During simulation, we have found out that seemingly unim-
portant decisions, like where to put the coupler to sample the
fiber’s global state, can have important consquences. If Alice
and Bob sample their signals before the gain stage, they can
increase their chances of detecting any active attack.
Additionally, proposed countermeasures to passive attacks,
like intentionally using a noise source to mask the differences
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Fig. 8: Plots (a) and (b) display the optical spectra at Alice
output coupler in the 01 and 10 states, respectively. Marked
in red is the contribution from Eve’s signal. (c) and (d) are
the corresponding optical spectra at Eve’s receiver after her
phase modulator. The fotocurrent measured by Eve is shown
in (e) for a direct detection receiver and in (f) for a heterodyne
coherent receiver. Solid lines correspond to the 01 state and
dashed to the 10 state.
between the 01 and the 10 states [32], [37], can backfire and
make it easier to perform an active attack as it allows for
a higher power in the probe pulses. Some other approaches
against passive attacks, like inserting selective bandpass filters
[37], also limit our active attack. However, in our simulations,
the required bandwidths to effectively block the probe pulses
also make the four state 00, 01, 10 and 11 difficult to
distinguish and impose a burden on the legitimate users.
There are simple countermeasures that could reduce the
threat posed by active hidden probe attacks. Our first sugges-
tion is placing an attenuator before the gain stage but after
the coupler used to sample the channel. Having a weaker
signal before the amplifier will degrade the signal-to-noise
ratio of the probe signal and Eve will need a higher optical
power to achieve the same resolution. With the attenuator
Alice and Bob increase their probability of detecting Eve’s
pulses with a minor disturbance to the global system. The
important parameter for the fiber laser is the total gain. An
additional loss can be compensated at the EDFA. Whether the
attenuator is effective or not will depend on the level of noise,
the bandwith and the time window for each bit of the key. If
we could guarantee the SNR is so low that Shannon’s noisy
channel theorem gives a capacity of less than 1 bit per time
window, that would be enough to discard undetected probes
as a threat, but that seems out of reach for Alice and Bob
with existing technology. However it points in the direction
a resistant system should aim to force Eve to use advanced
modulation and detection methods.
A second countermeasure would be introducing a random
group delay inside Alice’s and Bob’s setups. For instance,
introducing tension-controlled fiber Bragg gratings, Alice and
Bob could introduce random group delays under the direction
of a random sequence. Keeping the group delay unknown to
Eve would not permit her to synchronize her phase modulators.
This scheme could not be used in the length setup, though.
A third approach would be introducing a random phase filter
to distort Eve’s waveform. This approach has some limitations.
The changes should be dynamic. Otherwise, Eve could probe
the channel to learn its transfer function during the 00 and
11 states and use equalization to overcome any unexpected
changes to the signal. Microring devices could give the desired
effect and introduce a random phase that would distort the
probe’s waveform [55].
Any succesful solution will need to balance the complexity
on the legitimate users and give, at the same time, enough
protection against active attacks. An important open question
is whether some of the methods of optical steganography [45]–
[52], [54] could improve the abilities of Eve and whether there
are or not effective countermeasures against the most general
kind of active attacks that try to learn the chosen configuration
at the fiber ends by sending exploration pulses and observing
their changes after crossing the system of Alice or Bob.
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